Abstract. In this paper we address the open problem of bounding the price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation for undirected graphs posed in [1] . For the version of this problem that we consider, every vertex is associated with a selfish agent, and there is a distinguished source node to which all agents must connect. We show that the price of stability is O(log log n). We prove this by defining a particular improving dynamics in a related graph. This proof technique may have other applications and is of independent interest.
Introduction
The Internet is built, maintained, and used by noncooperative selfish agents. The Nash equilibria is a stable state in a noncooperative game in the sense that no agent can gain from unilaterally changing its behavior. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [13] suggested the study of the so-called price of anarchy. This is the ratio between the cost of the worst-case Nash equilibria and the cost of the social optimum.
An alternative notion to the price of anarchy is the price of stability [1] 1 . This is the ratio between the cost of the least expensive Nash equilibria and the cost of the social optimum. The price of stability is motivated by the scenario where one may have some centralized control for a limited time when the network is set-up. But, once the network is up and running, it should be stable without central control. Of course, the price of stability is not larger than the price of anarchy.
We consider the game of network design with fair cost allocation introduced in [1] . In this game, agent i has to choose a path (strategy) from source node s i to destination node t i . The cost of an edge e, c(e), is shared equally by all agents i whose chosen path p i = s i , ..., t i includes e.
It follows from the potential function arguments of [16, 15] that pure strategy Nash equilibria always exist for general congestion games, and in particular for the network design game that we consider here (both directed and undirected versions) 2 . In the following, we consider the price of stability for this network design game with respect to pure strategies.
The social optimum for this game is a minimum Steiner network connecting all source-destination pairs. Anshelevich et al. [1] show that the price of stability of this game is at most H(n) = 1 + 1/2 + · · · + 1/n, where n is the number of agents. They also exhibit a directed network where this bound is tight.
For undirected graphs the upper bound of H(n) on the price of stability still holds but the lower bound does not. Furthermore, for the case of two players and an undirected graph with a single source Anshelevich et al. [1] prove a tight bound on the price of stability of 4/3 which is less than H(2) = 3/2. Thus, [1] left open the question of whether there is a tighter bound for undirected graphs.
Our results We prove that for undirected graphs with an agent in every vertex and a distinguished source vertex r to which all agents must connect, the price of stability of the network design game of [1] is O(log log n) where n is the number of agents. In contrast, in directed graphs even when there is a single source and an agent in every vertex the price of stability is still Θ(log n). This follows by a slight modification of the lower bound example of [1] .
Related work on Network games Much of the work on network games has focused on congestion games [16, 15] . In particular, latency minimization and some network construction/design games can be modelled as congestion games or weighted congestion games.
Latency issues in the simplest network models (parallel links) can be modelled as games for makespan minimization for parallel machine scheduling/load balancing [13, 14, 10, 12, 4, 9, 11, 19] . Minimizing the total latency in general networks when there are many players, each controlling a negligible amount of flow, was studied by Roughgarden and Tardos [18] . This is called the nonatomic model. Roughgarden and Tardos proved that for linear latency functions the price of anarchy is exactly 4/3. The social cost of the maximum latency (rather than total latency) has also been considered in [7, 17] .
Recently, Awerbuch, Azar, and Epstein [3] , and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [6] considered the atomic version of game in general networks where each agent controls a fixed amount of flow which is referred to the "demand" of the agent. For linear latency functions and equal demands the price of anarchy is 2.5 and for general demands it is 2.618, both for pure and mixed strategies. They also generalize the results for polynomial latency functions [6, 3] , and considered the maximum latency rather than the sum [6] . Recently, Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [5] , also gave an upper bound of 1.6 on the price of stability for linear latency functions.
The game we consider here is also a congestion game where players are source-destination pairs and a strategy of a player is a single path from the source to the destination. The difference is that the cost a player pays for each edge e on its path is c(e)/x e where x e is the number of players using the edge. The price of anarchy for this game can be high as shown in [1] . But we are interested in the price of stability.
In [2] Anshelevitz et al. considered a connection game under a different cost model. In this model every agent must connect some set of terminals. Agents can offer to pay any fraction of the cost of an edge. If the total contribution of agents towards the purchase price of an edge is sufficient (reaches the price of the edge) then the edge is purchased. (In particular agents can offer nothing for an edge). A solution is an equilibrium if no agent can benefit from changing her strategy. This model can result in instances where only mixed strategy Nash equilibria exist. Arguably, mixed strategies are not applicable to this network construction application. While determining if a pure strategy Nash equilibria exists is NP-hard, for the single source case the price of stability is 1 [2] .
Preliminaries
Our input is an undirected graph G = (V, E), along with a distinguished source vertex r ∈ V , and a cost function c : E → R + . We will refer to c(e), e ∈ E, as the cost of the edge e.
Associated with every vertex v ∈ V is a selfish player. The network design game defines a strategy of a player v, to be a simple path in G connecting v to the source r. Let S v denote the strategy chosen by player v, we define the state S to be the set of all paths S v , for all players v. We define E(S) to be the set of edges that appear in one or more of the paths in state S. 3 It follows that the graph (V, E(S)) is a subgraph of G. In state S, let x s (e) be the number of players whose strategy contains edge e ∈ E. We define the cost of player v in state S, C S (v), to be e∈S v c(e)/x s (e). A state S is in a Nash equilibrium if no player can lower her cost by unilaterally changing her path to the source r.
We shall use the standard potential function Φ, see e.g. [15, 1] , that maps every state S into a numeric value: Φ(S) = e∈E c e H(x s (e)), where H(n) = 1 + 1/2 + 1/3 + · · · + 1/n is the n'th Harmonic number. If a single player v changes her strategy then the difference between the potential of the new state and the potential of the original state is exactly the change in the cost of player v. This implies that the improving response dynamics converges to a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Notice that the sum of the costs of all players in state S is exactly the sum of the costs of the edges of E(S). It follows that if the social cost function is the sum of the costs of all players then the social optimum of this game is a minimum spanning tree of the graph. We denote by OPT an arbitrary but fixed minimum spanning tree. Let p be the path from vertex u to vertex v in OPT. We define the distance between u and v in OPT, denoted by d opt (u, v) , to be the sum of the costs of the edges between vertex u and vertex v along p.
We say that a player v makes an em improvement move when the player chooses a new strategy
where S is the new state in which v chooses S v and for every w = v, S w = S w .
Let S be a state and let e = (x, y) ∈ S u . We say that u uses e in the direction x → y if y is closer than x to the r on S u . Similarly, we say that u uses e in the direction y → x if x is closer than y to the r on S u . We say that e appears in S in the direction x → y (or simply x → y appears in S) if there is a player u such that e appears in on S u in the direction x → y.
We limit player v to choose strategies S v of the following three types. In the following definitions assume that v is the only player making the change, and as before we denote the new state by S which is identical to S except that we replace S v by S v .
EE (Existing Edges
if S v uses an edge e = (x, y) / ∈ OPT in the direction x → y then x → y appears in S. OPT -The first edge e = (v, w) on S v is not in E(S)∪OPT, and E(S )−{e} ⊆ E(S). Furthermore, if S v uses an edge e = (x, y), e = e in the direction x → y then x → y appears in S.
Remark 1.
Note that if we start from OPT and perform only EE, OPT, and OPT moves then in the state that we reach, no edge (x, y) / ∈ OPT appears in both directions, x → y and y → x. It appears in the same direction determined by the OPT move that added (x, y).
Overview
In Section 4 we prove that if no player has an improvement move of type EE, OPT, or OPT then the state is a Nash equilibrium. We single out a specific Nash equilibrium, denoted by N , that we reach by carefully scheduling EE, OPT, and OPT moves. We then prove that the cost of N is larger than the cost of OPT by a factor of at most O(log log n).
This scheduling has two effects which our proof exploits. Let c(u, v) = z. After an OPT move of a player u that adds an edge (u, v) into the current state, we make further OPT and EE moves so that more players use (u, v).
We traverse players in increasing distance from u in OPT. Each player that improves her strategy by using the path to u in OPT following by the strategy of u makes the corresponding improvement move.
1. If there are O(log n) players whose distance to u in OPT is no larger than z/4 then the potential decreases by O(z log n). Therefore, the total cost introduced into N by such edges is O(OPT).
Edges in N \
OPT cannot be too close to each other in the metric defined by OPT. This allows us to relate the cost of all other edges in N \ OPT to the cost of OPT.
Due to the space limit some of the proofs are omitted.
Improvement moves result in Nash equilibria
We now show that if no player has an improvement move of type EE, OPT, or OPT then the current set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Let S be a state such that no player has an improving move of type EE. Then (V, E(S))
is a tree.
Proof. Assume that (V, E(S))
is not a tree. Since our strategies are simple paths there must be some vertex w from which one can follow two paths to r; one path is the strategy S w of w, and the other path, denoted byŜ w , is a suffix of some path S u of a vertex u that goes through w. If
then w has an improving EE move in which she replaces her path byŜ w which is a contradiction. On the other hand, if e∈S w c(e)/x s (e) ≤ e∈Ŝw c(e)/x s (e) then u has an improving EE move in which she replaces the suffixŜ w of S u by S w .
Let S be the state which is a tree with root r (this would be the case when no EE move is possible). Let P S (v, w) be the path from vertex v to w in state S and let LCA S (v, w) be the lowest common ancestor of v and w in state S, when we root the tree at r. We remove the subscript S when it is clear from the context.
Let
xs(e) , where S w is the strategy of w in state S. In other words, we take into account an additional player on the path from w to LCA(v, w) in S. One can think of C v S (w) as the cost of w after v changes her strategy to a strategy in which she takes some path to w and then continues to the source according to S w . It is clear that C v S (w) ≤ C S (w) since the share of w in the cost of each edge on
Lemma 2. Let S be a state in which no player can make an OPT, OPT, or EE improvement move. Then S is in a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. As there are no EE improving moves, by Lemma 1, state S is a tree. Assume that S is not in a Nash equilibrium. Then some player u has path S u such that the cost of u in the new state S , where only u changes her path to S u , is lower. Since S u is not an EE, OPT, or OPT move then S u must contain either (i) an edge e ∈ E(S) which is used in a direction that does not appear in S or (ii) an edge e / ∈ E(S) ∪ OPT which is not the first in S u . If there is an edge e in S u ∩ S which is used in S u in a direction which does not appear in S, then there must be an edge e / ∈ E(S ) in S u closer than e to the root (since S is a tree and S u is a simple path).
If u has more than one improving strategy then let S u be the one containing the minimum number of edges not in S. Let e = (v, w) be the edge in S u \ S closest to the source r (see Figure  1) . By the preceding argument, all edges following e in S u appear in the same direction in S.
Consider the strategy S u obtained by taking the path that follows S u until the first vertex v that is an ancestor of v concatenated with S v . Notice that since e = (v, w) is not in S u , then S u uses fewer edges which are not in S than S u . By our choice of S u the strategy S u can not be improving for u and therefore
as otherwise u has an improving strategy that has a smaller number of edges not in S. In state S no player can make OPT or OPT improvement moves, so for player v the strategy that consists of the edge e = (v, w) followed by the path S w is not an improving strategy, thus
Using inequalities (1) and (2), and the fact that Let S be the state identical to S except that player u uses S u rather than S u . We now argue that C S (u) ≤ C S (u), in contradiction to the minimality of S u with respect to edges not in S .
Since the contribution of each edge on the path from LCA S (v, w) to r to the costs C S (v) and C v S (w) is the same, we obtain that
Since each edge on the path from u to v and on the path from LCA S (v, w) to r contributes the same to C S (u) and C S (u) we obtain that
The lemma now follows since c(e)
5 Scheduling OPT, OPT, and EE Improvement Moves
Modifying the underlying network
For technical reasons that we will elaborate on later, instead of considering the stability problem on the graph G, we switch to a related multigraph, G. It would be clear from the definition of G that every minimum spanning tree in G corresponds to a minimum spanning tree in G with the same cost and vice versa. We also argue that a Nash equilibrium in the multigraph gives us a Nash equilibrium in the original graph with the same cost. We define G as follows. Associate with every edge e ∈ G, not in OPT, an identical edge e ∈ G. Replace an edge e ∈ G that is in OPT by parallel edges e 1 and e 2 in G, each of weight c(e). We say that e 1 and e 2 are associated with e and vice versa (See Figure 3) . Proof. Let N be a Nash equilibrium in G. Let N u be the strategy of player u in N . We convert N u to a strategy N u in G by replacing each edge e 1 or e 2 by the associated edge e in G ∩ OPT, and each other edge by its identical copy in G \ OPT.
Let N be the state in G defined by the strategies N u . The cost of N u in N is the same as the cost of N u for every player u. This follows since N is a tree and, therefore, contains only one of each pair of parallel edges e 1 and e 2 associated with an edge e ∈ G ∩ OPT. So the number of players using each edge in N is equal to the number of players using the corresponding edge in N .
If N is not a Nash equilibrium then some player u has an improving strategy N u . We map N u to a strategy N u of player u in G by replacing each edge e ∈ OPT ∩ N u by e 1 if e 1 ∈ N , by e 2 if e 2 ∈ N , and by either e 1 or e 2 if neither of them is in N . One can verify that the cost of N u is the same as the cost of N u which contradicts the fact that N is a Nash equilibrium.
We define EE, OPT, or OPT moves in G the same as we defined them in Section 2 where by edges of OPT in G we refer to both copies of each edge of OPT in G.
Improvement scheduling algorithm
In this section we define our Improvement scheduling algorithm which we often refer to as the scheduler. We start the scheduler on G from an initial state isomorphic to OPT. We define the initial state S to consist of all edges e 1 ∈ G associated with some e ∈ OPT. The scheduler halts and the process converges when no EE, OPT, or OPT moves are possible. The scheduler works in phases where in each phase we make a single OPT move.
Let S be some state, that includes strategy S v for player v and S w for player w. Given that w is a vertex on S v , we define Follow(S, v, w) as a possible alternative strategy for vertex v. Strategy  Follow(S, v, w) consists of the prefix of S v up to and including vertex w, followed by S w .
As an aid to the exposition, we use colors red and blue to label the parallel edges of G . Initially, for every e ∈ OPT we assign the edge e 1 the color red and the edge e 2 the color blue. In the beginning of a phase we may change the assignment of the red/blue colors to the parallel edges.
OptFollow(S, v, w) is a new strategy for player v that is defined if there is an edge (v, w) that is a copy of an edge in OPT colored blue. The strategy OptFollow(S, v, w) consists of the single edge (v, w) followed by S w .
A phase of the Scheduling Algorithm: Let S be the state at the beginning of a phase. We maintain the invariant that in S no player can make an improving OPT or EE move, and thereby S is a tree according to Lemma 1. Before the phase starts we make a Recoloring step. In this step we recolor red each edge in S which is a copy of an edge in OPT, and we color blue the other copy of the edge which not in S (since S is a tree according to Lemma 1).
OPT-move:
The phase starts with some player u changing her strategy by an improving OPT move. We denote by S the state after this OPT move of u at the beginning of the phase.
OPT-loop:
Following this OPT move we start a breadth first search of OPT from u and for each player v in increasing order of d opt (u, v) we do the following.
Let CurS be the state right before we process v, and let p(v) be the parent of v in the breadth first search tree. We check if OptFollow (CurS, v, p(v) ) is an improving strategy for v. If it is improving then v changes her strategy to OptFollow (CurS, v, p(v) ). If it is not improving then we truncate the breadth first search at v. Note that all these OptFollow moves are defined since we started the phase with a recoloring step. We call this part of the phase of the scheduler the OPT-loop since all improvement moves made in this part are OPT moves. We denote by D the set of players consisting of u and players who performed an OPT move in the OPT-loop.
EE-loop:
For each player w ∈ D let M w be the subset of descendants of w in the tree S rooted at r, such that v ∈ M w if and only if v / ∈ D and w is the first player in D along the path from v to r in S. In the second part of the phase we traverse the vertices in w∈D M w . For each player v ∈ M w , let CurS be the state right after we process w, if the strategy Follow(CurS, v, w) is an improving strategy for v, then v changes her strategy to Follow(CurS, v, w). We call this part of the phase of the scheduler the EE-loop since all improvement moves made in this part are EE moves.
In the last part of the scheduler we perform any improving OPT or EE moves until no such improving move exists. Then the phase ends, and we start the next one if there is an improving OPT move, or we stop if there isn't.
For an example of a phase of the scheduler see Figure 3 . The scheduler performs only OPT, OPT, and EE moves. Since these moves are improvement moves, each such move causes a decrease of the potential function. Analogously to the argument in [1] , a series of improvement moves in a finite potential game is finite. Therefore the scheduler halts. When the scheduler stops there are no OPT, OPT or EE moves which are improving, so by Lemma 2 the resulting state is a Nash equilibrium.
The price of stability
In this section we bound the cost of the Nash equilibrium reached by the scheduler.
Lemma 4. Assume that no improving OPT moves, and no improving EE moves are possible in a state S. Then for every pair of players v and w the inequality
Consider the strategy S v that consists of the path of OPT edges from v to w followed by the strategy of w. The strategy
, so it is an improving OPT move and we get a contradiction.
Let S be the state after player u performs an OPT move during the execution of the scheduler and let S be the state preceding this move. Let the cost of the newly used edge e = (u, v) be c(e ) = z. In the following lemma we show that for every player w for which d opt (u, w) ≤ z 4 , w would pay less if she takes the path in OPT to u and then continues as u in S . The intuition of why this holds is as follows: From Lemma 4 we know that when no OPT moves are possible the cost of u in S could not be much larger than the cost of w. The difference is about d opt (u, w) ≤ z 4 . So if we make w go through u in S her cost may increase by at most z/2. It increases by at most z/4 for the path to get to u and by at most z/4 since the cost of u may be larger by at most z/4 from the cost of w. In S however w will split the cost of the edge (u, v) with u, paying only z/2 to go through it and thereby recovering the extra cost to get to u.
Lemma 5. Let S be a state where no OPT moves and no EE moves which are improving are possible. Let S be the new state after player u makes an improving OPT move defined by the edge e = (u, v). Let the cost of c(e ) be z. Then for every player w for which
Proof. The strategy of player u in S is the edge (u, v) followed by the strategy of player v, S v , that is C S (u) = C S (v) + z. Since u performed an improving OPT move, C S (u) < C S (u), and thus
Since in S there are no improving OPT moves and no improving EE moves, then, by Lemma 4,
We claim that C u S (w) ≤ C S (w). First note that the strategy S w is equal to the strategy S w , since only the strategy of u is different in S and S . The cost of w however may be different in S and S . Split S w into two pieces. One piece, denoted by P 1 , from w to LCA S (u, w), and the other piece, denoted by P 2 , from LCA S (u, w) to the source (see Figure 2) . In S, player w shares with player u the cost of the edges in P 2 , but this may not be true in S , so for e ∈ P 2 , x s (e) ≥ x s (e). Consider P 1 . In S player w does not share with player u the cost of the edges on P 1 , but she may share this cost with u in S . So for e ∈ P 1 we have x s (e) + 1 ≥ x s (e). In contrast C u S (w) is the tentative cost of w assuming that she shares with u the cost for every edge of her strategy. Therefore,
as we claimed. From inequalities (4) and (5) we obtain
Considering inequalities (3) and (6) we get C S (w) + d opt (u, w) > C S (v) + z, and therefore , so they change their strategy to the strategy that uses OPT edges to connect to u followed by the strategy of u (See Lemma 6). Players q1, q2, q3 change their strategy in the EE-loop, Mw 6 = {q1, q2}, Mw 2 = {q3}, and
Remark 2. Let u be the player making an improving OPT move using the edge e = (u, v). Let z = c(e ). For every w ∈ S v (including v itself), C S (w) ≤ C S (v), and therefore by Lemma 5,
Let S be the state after player u performs an OPT move during the execution of the scheduler, defined by the edge e u = (u, v) whose cost is z . Let w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w m be the vertices with , w i+1 ) . In particular w 0 = u, and the vertex w 1 is adjacent to u in OPT. Lemma 5 implies in particular that the strategy OptFollow (S, w 1 , u) is improving for w 1 . But what happens after w 1 changes her strategy? Can w 2 still make an OPT move using some edge which is not in S and lower her cost? The following lemma shows that indeed this is the case. Proof. We prove by induction on i that in S i ,
for every ≥ i. From this the lemma clearly follows since the cost of OptFollow(
. For i = 1 we have S 1 = S and Inequality (7) holds by Lemma 5. Assume that Inequality (7) holds for S 1 , . . ., S i , and for all relevant vertices in each of these states. We now show that after vertex w i changes her strategy to OptFollow(S i , w i , w k ), where w k is the vertex adjacent to w i on the path from w i to u in OPT, then Inequality (7) holds for S i+1 and for every ≥ i + 1.
Fix ≥ i + 1. We show that
from which the induction step follows. Recall that the states S i and S i+1 differ only in the strategy of player w i . For each ≥ i + 1 the strategy of player w in S i and her strategy in S i+1 are still the same as her strategy was in S (and S ), and we denote it by S w . Similarly, by Remark 2, the strategy S v of v in S does not change while processing w 1 , . . ., w m .
We establish Inequality (8) by showing that: (i) each edge that contributes a negative amount to the left side of (8) contributes the same negative amout to the right side of (8), (ii) no edge contributes positive amount to the right side of (8) .
To prove (i), consider an edge e ∈ S w such that the number of players using e in S i+1 is larger (by 1) than the number of players using e in S i since player w i uses e after she makes the change. It follows that e ∈ S v since the only edges in the new strategy of w i in S i+1 that were in S (and therefore could be in S w ) are those edges in S v . This holds since by the induction hypothesis in S i+1 the strategy of each player w j , where j ≤ i, is a path consisting of blue copies of OPT edges that are not in S, up to vertex v, and continuing from there by the path S v .
To prove (ii) consider an edge e ∈ S v . Clearly player v pays in S i+1 at most the share of e that she pays in S i .
To further illustrate the proof of Lemma 6 consider the phase of the scheduler illustrated in Figure 3 . The state S = S 1 is the state after u changes her strategy to (u → v → y → r) shown in 3(d). At the first step of the OP T -loop w 1 changes her strategy from (w 1 → u → w 3 → y → r) to (w 1 → u → v → y → r), and we reach S 2 . Now consider the cost C S 2 (w 2 ) compared to the cost C S 1 (w 2 ). The edge (v, y) contributes more to C S 1 (w 2 ) than to C S 2 (w 2 ) because w 1 uses this edge in S 2 but not in S 1 . However, since (v, y) ∈ S v , C S 1 (v) is larger than C S 2 (v) by the same amount.
Remark 3.
To make Lemma 6 work we had to introduce G. With one set of OPT edges it is possible that when w i changes her strategy she uses OPT edges that can be part of the strategy of w for some > i that are not in S v , and are not on the path between w and u in OPT. This may make the strategy of w cheaper when she considers making her change.
The following lemma gives a lower bound on the decrease in the potential during a phase of the scheduler. As before, let S be the state after player u performs an OPT move and uses an edge e = (u, v) ∈ OPT. Let D be the set of vertices accumulated while the scheduler performed the OPTloop, together with u, and let S be the state after the execution of the EE-loop. Consider an edge e ∈ OPT which was the first edge in the strategy S w in state S, of some player w who is in D. By the definition of the scheduler, in S , the first edge in the strategy of w, would be an edge in OPT (or e for u) and not e. However it could be that some descendant of w still uses e in her strategy. We want to show that this could not be the case. That is, while performing the EE-loop all these descendants take an alternative strategy that does not use e.
For example consider the phase illustrated in Figure 3 (e), and 3(f). After the OP T -loop w 3 does not use edge (w 3 , y), but q 1 still uses this edge. We show that during the EE-loop q 1 would replace her strategy, and at the end of the phase she does not use (w 3 , y). Proof. The only players that can use e in S are players that used e in S. Since S is a tree, each of these players is a descendant of player w in S. Descendants of w which are in D do not use e in their strategy in S . So in the rest of the proof we consider only descendants of w not in D.
Let x / ∈ D be a descendant of w. If x replaces her strategy in the EE-loop then x does not include e in her new strategy. This is because her new strategy contains the same path as in S to get to a vertex in D, then a path in OPT to get to u, continued with edge e = (u, v) and then the path S v which is in S. None of these subpaths contains e.
We have to show that every descendant of w in S replaces her strategy in the EE-loop. For every vertex w ∈ D, let M w be, as in Section 5.2, the subset of descendants of w such that m ∈ M w if and only if m / ∈ D and w is the first player in D along the path S m , from m to r in state S. Every descendant of w in S is either in M w or in M y for some descendant y of w in S. So every descendant of w could have changed her strategy to follow a vertex in D when the scheduler runs the EE-loop. See Figure 3 .
Let vertex x be a descendant of w in S, such that x ∈ M y . Notice, that player x does not change her strategy from the beginning of the phase until we process her in the EE-loop. Let S 1 be the state right after y changes her strategy in the OPT-loop and let S 2 be the state in which we process x in EE-loop. Let F be the strategy Follow(S 1 , x, y). Strategy F is an improving strategy for x in state S 1 . We prove by induction that F remains an improving strategy of x in every state following S 1 and preceding S 2 (including S 2 ).
For any state T we denote by F (T ) the state obtained from T by changing the strategy of x to F . Assume that C T (x) > C F (T ) (x) holds for some state T following S 1 , but preceding S 2 . Let q be the next player that changes her strategy, and let T be a state after it. We need to prove that
Similarly we can write the inequality C T (x) > C F (T ) (x) explicitly as follows (recall that T x = T x ) e∈Tx c(e) x T (e) > e∈F c(e) x F (T ) (e) .
For every edge e, that q stops using, we have that x F (T ) (e) = x F (T ) (e) − 1, and x T (e) = x T (e) − 1. Similarly for every edge e that q starts using, we have that x F (T ) (e) = x F (T ) (e) + 1, and x T (e) = x T (e) + 1. For other edges x F (T ) (e) = x F (T ) (e), and x T (e) = x T (e). We show that (i) every e ∈ F such that x F (T ) (e) = x F (T ) (e) − 1 belongs to T x , (ii) every e ∈ T x such that x T (e) = x T (e) + 1 belongs to F . This implies that Inequality 10 holds assuming that Inequality 9 holds before the change of q.
To prove (i) consider an edge e ∈ F such that x F (T ) (e) = x F (T ) (e) − 1. Then e must be in the prefix of F from x to y and therefore in T x .
To prove (ii) consider an edge e ∈ T x such that x T (e) = x T (e) + 1. Edge e must be on S v . Since S v ⊂ F , e ∈ F as required.
Let N be the Nash equilibrium reached by the scheduler. We would like to relate the cost of N to the cost of OPT. So we partition the edges in N into two classes: those that are in OPT and those that are not in OPT. Clearly the total cost of the edges in N ∩ OPT is no larger than the cost of OPT. So our real concern are those edges in N \ OPT. Each such edge got into N by an OPT move performed by the scheduler at the beginning of some phase and remained there until the end of the process. We associate each such edge (u, v) with player u that actually improved her strategy by the OPT move that added the edge (u, v) to N . We further partition the edges e = (u, v) in N \ OPT according to the number of vertices in OPT in a neighborhood of size c(e)/4 around the associated player. Specifically, let e = (u, v) ∈ N \ OPT be associated with player u. We say that e is crowded if |{w | d opt (u, w) ≤
c(e)
4 }| ≥ log n, and we say that e is light otherwise.
Lemma 9. The total cost of all crowded edges is O(OPT).
Proof. Let e be a crowded edge in N \ OPT. By Lemma 7, in the phase that started with the OPT move that put e into N , the potential dropped by Ω(c(e) log n). Since initially the potential is at most OPT · log n, and is always decreasing, the lemma follows.
Lemma 10 bounds the total cost of light edges.
Lemma 10. The total cost of all light edges in N is O(OPT · log log n).
Proof. Let U be the set of players assigned to light edges. For a player v ∈ U we denote the associated light edge by e v . We define the cost of v to be the cost of e v and denote it by z v .
First we show that for v ∈ U , z v ≤ d opt (v, r) . Let S be the state right before edge e v was added and let S be the state after e v was added. The scheduler only allows new OPT edges at the start of a phase, thus, S is a state at the beginning of a phase. According to Lemma 
